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Abstract 
 
The critical literature on commercial monitoring and so-called ‘free labour’ (Terranova 2000) locates exploitation in realms 
beyond the workplace proper, noting the productivity of networked activity including the creation of user-generated-content and 
the profitability of commercial sites for social networking and communication. The changing context of productivity in these 
realms, however, requires further development of a critical concept of exploitation. This article defines exploitation as the 
extraction of unpaid, coerced, and alienated labour. It considers how such a definition might apply to various forms of unpaid but 
profit-generating online activity, arguing that commercial monitoring redoubles the conscious, intentional activity of users in 
ways that render it amenable to a critique of exploitation. Given the role of commercial monitoring in the emerging online 
economy, the paper emphasizes the importance of supplementing privacy critiques with approaches that identify the ways in 
which new forms of surveillance represent a form of power that seeks to manage and control consumer behaviour. 
 
 
 
Imagine that, once upon a time, a community was faced with the prospect of a new kind of roadway that 
provided exciting new opportunities for commerce and communication, politics and even social life. 
Imagine further that the members of this community were told it would be much more efficient for the 
private sector to control and develop this roadway if only it were allowed to set the terms of access, which 
would include tagging everyone who used the new road and tracking their activities so that anything they 
did would be recorded, stored, and eventually used to manipulate them without their consent or 
knowledge. Faced with the prospect of such a trade-off, the community would likely express its concern 
not just about privacy, but also about the social relations that empowered a private, commercial entity the 
power to both set the terms of access and claim the benefits that flowed from tracking the populace. 
Indeed, such a formulation might have encouraged reflection on alternative possibilities: might it be 
feasible to obtain the advantages of the new road without relying upon a commercial model of data 
collection and target marketing?  
 
Returning from this imagined ‘once upon a time’ to the reality of the recent commercial development of 
the internet, however, the emerging business model was not laid out quite so clearly or in such stark 
terms. With little in the way of public deliberation, we have been party to the aggressive privatization of 
what started as a publicly funded communication network. The public’s enthusiastic embrace of the 
affordances of digital communication has been taken as tacit, if largely uninformed, consent to the 
privatization of the internet and the commercial colonization of an ever-growing portion of our 
communicative lives. Despite the somewhat dramatic scope of these changes, the discussion about the 
emerging monitoring-based economy has been largely limited to questions of threats to an increasingly 
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contested and variable conception of privacy. The larger question about the power relations that have 
shaped control over the capture and use of personal information, resulting in the trade-off between 
convenience and control over our personal information – remain largely outside the frame of discussion.  
 
Privacy debates thus come to stand in for discussions that might more directly address the question of 
who controls the information infrastructure and for what ends – questions, in other words, of the power 
that both shapes the use of new media technologies and the ways in which these uses in turn reproduce 
existing power relations. Perhaps this logic of deflection explains both the intensity and the frustrating 
character of discussions of privacy – there is something disconcerting about seeing issues related to the 
concentration of corporate control over economic, social, and informational resources squeezed into the 
much narrower frame of threats to personal privacy. The goal of this essay is to open up some avenues for 
inserting questions of power, control, and, in particular, exploitation into a consideration of the 
implications of the privatization and commercialization of communication resources in the digital era. 
The notion of exploitation helps invoke questions of power and control – and while it is frequently 
invoked in discussions of the digital economy, more work needs to be done to update it for the interactive 
era.  
 
Specifically, most discussions of exploitation in the online economy fail to mark important distinctions 
between different types of so-called ‘free labour’ (Terranova 2000) supplied by consumers via interactive 
platforms, including intentionally created forms of user generated content (such as the original videos 
posted to YouTube), the promotional work done by fans (such as the indie music fans studied by Baym 
and Burnett (2008)), the building and maintenance of online social networks of various types, and the 
activity that underlies all of these: the generation of increasingly detailed information about all of these 
activities – and more. It is the monitored aspect of networked interactivity that lies at the heart of the 
account of exploitation advanced in this essay. Because all forms of online activity contribute to the 
creation of this data, they are all implicated in the account of exploitation developed here. At the same 
time, however, this account distinguishes between the two layers of online productivity described by 
Gehl: “In a typical Web 2.0 site, there is a surface, where users are free to produce content and make 
affective connections, and there is a hidden depth, where new media capitalists convert user-generated 
content into exchange-values” (2009, 25). This is particularly true in the case of user generated data – the 
wide range of information collected by interactive platforms about users, usually invisibly as they go 
about the course of their wired lives, or at least that portion of their lives that involve digital, networked 
devices. As Gehl puts it,  
 
Users are allowed much control over the surface of Web 2.0; they are the ones who fill in 
the ghostly frames, make connections, remix content, and process digital artifacts. 
However, all too often in Web 2.0, the depth – the code (both computer and legal) and the 
material behind the ghostly frames - is controlled by new media capitalists, who deny 
users the ability to determine how their content is used (2009, 25).  
 
It is the role of monitoring in the exploitation of user-generated activity that this essay focuses upon in 
order to argue that commercial surveillance has a central role to play in the forms of alienation, 
manipulation, and control associated with the interactive economy.      
 
Accounts of exploitation in the realm of commercial surveillance must contend with the ways in which 
the commercial promotion of interactivity has framed it as an antidote to the shortcomings of mass 
society, a means of restoring what was lost in the rationalization and “massification” of culture. A 
contemporary sense of privacy, such accounts imply, is in part a product of the anonymity of urban 
industrial life – and perhaps a symptom of its alienation. In the pre-mass era, merchants of all kinds had 
more personal relationships with their customers, the type of relationships gestured at nostalgically by 
new forms of personalization, customization, and targeting. These surveillance-based strategies are 
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typically equated with enhanced consumer service and care by the companies that collect and use the 
information – as if the algorithms that sift data and target individual consumers are the direct descendants 
of the corner grocer who packed our groceries for us or the cobbler with a custom template for each client 
hanging on the wall. 
 
Similarly, so-called user generated content is portrayed as a restoration of more participatory forms of 
cultural production in which the boundary between performer and audience was more porous. For their 
part, social networking applications promise to restore the priority of peer conversation, gossip and social 
contacts over “top-down” mass media as sources of information about the world. In both cases, however, 
the resuscitation of pre-mass society comes with a twist: it relies upon a thoroughly privatized and 
commercialized infrastructure, as if industrial capitalism has managed to carve out a niche for pre-mass 
society in order to encompass it in its commercial embrace. The result has been a kind of split-level 
combination of past and future; on one level there are DIY forms of media production, enhanced forms of 
social networking and so on, while at another level all of this activity is captured, recorded, stored, sorted, 
and mined.  
 
At times, these two levels touch, often to somewhat disconcerting effect, as changes at the level of data-
capture affect ‘surface’ level capabilities. Consider the example of Facebook’s frequent modifications, 
designed to maximize both the level of interaction (and engagement) and thus the amount of data that can 
be captured and used. If, at the surface level, Facebook hearkens back to the pre-mass-society role of 
social networks as sources of news and information, it is hard to forget that it does so for distinctly 
commercial purposes. The anthropologist Danny Miller, for example, has argued that Facebook counters 
the decline of community commonly associated with “the rise of capitalism and industrialism” (2011, 
134). As he puts it, “whatever exactly we mean by the word community, Facebook seems to have revived 
and expanded it” (2011, 134). As a technology of community, however, it is an extremely malleable one, 
shaped just as much by the whims of the coders as by rapidly evolving ‘traditions’ of use. If, to put it 
somewhat differently, Facebook revives some of the aspects of pre-mass society (albeit on a global scale), 
it has elements of funhouse unpredictability to it: from one day to the next the ability to communicate 
with others shifts dramatically at the whims of hidden engineers. One day, your friends need to come to 
visit your page to see what you’ve posted, the next, whatever you post gets “pushed” into their news 
feeds. It’s as if there is some backstage puppet-master, changing the rules of our interactions as they take 
place; one day our voices work one way, the next, quite differently. Facebook can constantly change its 
capabilities and affordances, and frequently does – always with the goal of fostering greater activity on its 
platform, and of capturing a broader spectrum of information about user activity in order to market to us 
more effectively – and to the commercial clients who build their applications on its platform.  
 
In this regard, Facebook functions as a kind of Matrix, a virtual construct that allows us to defy the laws 
of physics by gossiping globally, but one that is subject to manipulation by those who control the 
infrastructure. In this regard it recalls Zizek’s description of what he describes as the two sides of 
perversion of cyberspace: “on the one hand, reduction of reality to a virtual domain regulated by arbitrary 
rules that can be suspended; on the other hand, the concealed truth of this freedom, the reduction of the 
subject to an utter instrumentalized passivity” (1999, 22). Passivity is not quite right here, given the 
frenetic level of activity on Facebook; perhaps an instrumentalized hyper-sociality would be more 
accurate. The flip side of the dramatically expanded capacity for socializing, communicating, networking, 
is reliance upon a thoroughly commercialized platform, one that will continue to be tweaked, adjusted, 
transformed in order to more effectively serve the marketing strategies that support it.   
 
1. Database Manipulation 
 
One potentially disturbing fact frequently gets lost amidst debates about the fate of privacy in the digital 
era and the crossfire between celebratory and critical claims about the online economy; namely, the 
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emerging commercial model for the interactive economy has become reliant on the prospect that 
information-based target marketing and data mining will be increasingly effective in manipulating and 
channeling consumer desire. This prospect may be nothing more than marketing hype, but the point is 
that whether or not such a model actually works, it serves as the basis for the developing of an online 
economy. We might dismiss the claims of marketers in theory, but in practice we are betting they are 
right – otherwise we would need to develop a different way of supporting many of the interactive services 
and applications that have become an important part of the commercial and professional lives of so many.  
 
The model of data-driven target marketing relies, in turn, on the promise of statistically robust powers of 
prediction, a promise fed by techniques with names like ‘cluster analysis’, ‘biological response analysis’, 
‘collaborative filtering’, ‘predictive analytics’, and ‘sentiment analysis’. What all of these have in 
common is their reliance on the capture of large amounts of detailed data about people, products, and 
their various attributes in order to predict behaviour. The goal is not so much to follow the lead of 
consumers as to find ways to predict how various modulations in message, timing, context, and other 
relevant factors might influence behaviour in accordance with the priorities of marketers. As one accounts 
puts it, “predictive analytics” – the attempt to unearth correlations from mountains of data – “uses past 
behaviour and complex algorithms to anticipate future behaviour by customer segments in a way that 
cannot be accurately performed using human intuition” (Business Times 2010, 8).  
 
The goal of predictive analytics is, in a sense, both pre-emptive and productive, predictive and 
manipulative: to manage risks before they emerge or become serious while at the same time maximizing 
sales. The goal, in other words, is to integrate possible futures into present behaviour and thereby to 
manage the future. This type of management requires ongoing monitoring, modulation, and adjustment to 
bring the anticipated consequences of a modelled future into the present in ways that account for the 
former, and thus alter the latter. In so doing, it gives “populations over to being a probe or sensor of the 
improbable future” (Clough 2009, 53) – or, in the case of marketing research the obverse: a probable 
future. To treat a population as a probe is not simply to measure and record it but, at the same time, to 
subject it to ongoing experimentation. This is the form that predictive analytics takes in the age of what 
Ian Ayres (2007) calls super-crunching: not the attempt to get at an underlying demographic or emotional 
‘truth’, but the ongoing search for productive correlations. Marketers and advertisers use the flexible, 
controlled, interactive environment to subject consumers to an ongoing series of randomized, controlled 
experiments. Access to the database is crucial for generating this kind of information. As Ayres puts it, 
“The sample size is key” (2007, 49) – the bigger the better, which is what makes the internet such a rich 
site for this kind of research. 
  
2. Exploitation 2.0 
  
Given its importance to the commercial development of the online economy, surveillance has a central 
role to play in any account of its distinctive forms of exploitation. The notion of exploitation is a recurring 
theme in critical accounts of the digital economy, although it is more often invoked than explained. In 
what has become a canonical discussion of the ‘free labour’ provided by chat-room moderators in 
exchange for access to online services, Terranova notes that such productive activities can, in some 
contexts, be described as both voluntary and subject to exploitation: “Free labor is the moment where this 
knowledgeable consumption of culture is translated into productive activities that are pleasurably 
embraced and at the same time often shamelessly exploited” (2000, 37). Similarly, Michael Hardt’s 
(1999) discussion of the network economy notes that, “in those networks of culture and communication, 
collective subjectivities are produced and sociality is produced – even if those subjectivities and that 
sociality are directly exploitable by capital” (1999, 93). Petersen’s (2008) account of the exploitation of 
user-generated content argues that the commercial “architecture of participation turns into an architecture 
of exploitation and enclosure, transforming users into commodities that can be sold on the market”. 
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For Ritzer and Jurgensen (2010), the capture of value online represents the extension of the logic of 
capital into new spaces and temporalities: “it appears that capitalists have found another group of people 
– beyond workers (producers) – to exploit and a new source of surplus value. In this case, capitalism has 
merely done what it has always done – found yet another way to expand” (2010, 21). For Comor, forms 
of interactive participation reinforce rather than revolutionizing the social relations upon which 
exploitation relies: “as long as private property, contracts and exchange values are dominant mediators of 
our political economy, disparities and exploitative relationships will remain largely unchallenged – 
unchallenged, at least, through the auspices of presumption” (2010, 14).  
 
The notion of exploitation, in short, has become a recurring theme in recent accounts of the productivity 
of networks. Most of these critiques refer to the conscious productive activity of users beyond the 
confines of the workplace proper – activity such as fan labour, chat room moderation, and the creation of 
user-generated content – that users engage in voluntarily but which also generates value for commercial 
entities that are able to piggyback on user activity. The tendency has been to locate this kind of creative 
activity in the category of immaterial labour described by Lazzarato as the “activity that produces the 
‘cultural content’ of the commodity,” noting that it, “involves a series of activities that are not normally 
recognized as ‘work’ – in other words, the kinds of activities involved in defining and fixing cultural and 
artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, and, more strategically, public opinion” (1996, 137). 
Such labour corresponds to what Michael Hardt (also following Lazzarato) describes as an ‘affective’ 
form of immaterial labour: “the production and manipulation of affects,” which, “requires (virtual or 
actual) human contact and proximity” (1999, 93). This is not, however, an account that lends itself 
directly to the economic value generated by the capture and use of user data – at least insofar as this is not 
consciously created as part of deliberate social networking activity.  
 
Zwick, Bonsu and Darmody (2008) also have recourse to the critique of exploitation in their perceptive 
discussion of the much-hyped marketing paradigm of consumer co-creation (the reliance of producers on 
consumer participation to help build and communicate brand image) as a form of governance. They argue 
that the economic success of sites that rely on various forms of user-generated content (including 
Facebook, MySpace and Second Life), “expropriate the cultural labour of the masses and convert it into 
monetary value: each in their own specific way, but all according to the same general logic” (2008, 180). 
Here again, however, it might be useful to distinguish between some of these different ways – including 
active user participation in marketing to themselves, the expropriation of user-generated content, and the 
capture of information that can be turned back upon users. This is not to say that any of these categories 
are exempt from exploitation, but rather to argue that we might need to think a bit differently about how 
exploitation functions in these varying instances.  
 
The invocation of some notion of exploitation is compelling for a number of reasons, including the fact 
that a critique of privacy invasion does not do justice to the economically productive character of 
consumer surveillance. The prospect that advertising might become more effective because it will be able 
to predict human behaviour with a greater degree of reliability, and thereby to help manage the populace 
more efficiently in accordance with commercial imperatives, is disturbing in a different way from privacy 
concerns. There is more at stake in interactive forms of surveillance than violations of traditional privacy 
norms: specifically the concentration of new forms of predictive power in the hands of commercial 
interests. We might add to this the redoubling of exploitation in the realm of consumption. As Zwick, 
Bonsu and Darmody put it, “consumers are asked to pay for the surplus extracted from their own work” 
(2008, 186).  
 
One of the challenges of mobilizing the notion of exploitation in online contexts is that it takes a critical 
concept traditionally associated with industrial labour’s sweatshop conditions and transposes it into a 
realm of relative affluence and prosperity – that is, a realm inhabited by those with the time and access to 
participate in online activities. For good reason, it is harder to get worked up about the ‘exploitative’ 
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conditions of user-generated content sites than about the depredations of sweatshop labour and workforce 
exploitation. In the case of user generated content, for example, we are talking in many cases about 
affluent consumers engaging in what might be described as optional activities: you don’t have to join 
Facebook or Twitter, it is not necessary for survival in contemporary society (yet?) to get a Gmail 
account, or to shop online.  
 
Thus, rejoinders to critiques of exploitation in such contexts typically invoke both the lack of coercion 
and the pleasures of participation. As Nancy Baym and Robert Burnett (2008) put it in their account of 
the promotional work done by indie music fans: “We are loathe to dismiss their claims of affective 
pleasure and the desire they feel to spread what brings them joy as evidence of exploitation” (2008, 23). 
Her study invokes the claim, so familiar to accounts of the promise of interactive technology, that their 
activities recapture the pleasures of pre-mass society: “Their social response to the pleasures of music is 
situated in deeply meaningful social phenomena that hearken back to much earlier phases of musical 
history, phases before there was an industry, when music was always performed in communities by locals 
for locals rather than by distant celebrities for adoring fans” (2008, 23). Such forms of enjoyment are, 
then, allegedly, incompatible with the notion that they are being exploited:  “To claim that these people 
are exploited is to ignore how much these other forms of capital matter in the well being of well rounded 
humans” (2008, 23).  
 
It is not clear however, that the Marxist inflected critiques of exploitation invoked by such accounts are 
incompatible with a sense of enjoyment or pleasure. The fact of exploitation need not prevent workers 
from taking a certain pleasure in their craft or in the success of a collaborative effort well done.  Nor is it 
the case that accounts of exploitation necessarily denigrate the activities or the meanings they may have 
for those who participate in them rather than the social relations that underwrite expropriation and 
alienation. The point of a critique of exploitation is neither to disparage the pleasures of workers nor the 
value of the tasks being undertaken. To argue otherwise is to stumble into a kind of category confusion: 
an attempt to reframe structural conditions as questions of individual pleasure and desire. Taken to the 
extreme, such accounts recapitulate familiar but less savory defences of exploitation. The critique of 
exploitation does not devalue individual pleasure any more than such pleasures nullifies exploitative 
social relations. More work needs to be done to define what might be meant by exploitation in non-wage-
labour contexts to bolster both the critiques of exploitation in the digital economy and to address the way 
in which these are, in turn, dismissed (for failing to acknowledge the benefits and pleasures received by 
those engaged in various forms of ‘free labour’).  
 
Since the critiques of exploitation that concern this essay hearken back to Marx’s critique of capitalism, it 
is worth exploring the core elements of this critique. Holmstrom offers a clear summary of a Marxist 
conception of exploitation: “The profits of capitalists, then, according to Marx’s theory, are generated by 
surplus, unpaid and forced labour, the product of which the producers do not control” (1997, 80). Central 
to such an account is the notion that coercion is embedded in the relations that structure so-called ‘free’ 
choices. That is to say, coercion does not require someone standing over the worker with a gun or some 
other threat of force. As Holmstrom puts it, “Persons who have no access to the means of production 
other than their own capacity to labour do not need to be forced to work by chains and laws” (1997, 79) – 
those are in place, however, to ensure that they cannot gain control of resources other than their labour 
power. The presence of background forms of coercion in seemingly free choices is true not just for 
industrial wage labour, but also for unwaged domestic labour. Coercion is inscribed into the social 
relations themselves. Indeed, the elaboration of the ways in which coercion operate within seemingly free 
relations of exchange is a touchstone of critical accounts of marketplace exploitation.  
 
The further point to be made is that exploitation is not simply about profit, but also alienation. As 
Holmstrom puts it, “what workers really sell to the capitalists, according to Marx, is not labour, but the 
capacity to labour or labour power, which capitalists then use as they wish for the day” (1997, 79). In 
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selling this capacity, workers relinquish control over their own productive activity – what Marx 
(1844/2009) also describes as the form of conscious control that distinguishes ‘species-being’ from 
unreflective life. Alienation subsists not just in the surrender of conscious control over productive 
activity, but also, consequently in its product. This is a formulation that draws its force not from the 
description of exploitation in Das Kapital, but from the 1844 Manuscripts, where Marx forcefully 
elaborates the wages of estranged labour: “The worker places his life in the object; but now it no longer 
belongs to him, but to the object. […] What the product of his labour is, he is not. Therefore, the greater 
this product, the less is he himself” (1844/2009, 27).  
 
Exploitation is not simply about a loss of monetary value, but also a loss of control over one’s productive 
and creative activity. To push a bit further, it is the latter sense of exploitation that drives the critique, 
insofar as the deprivation of economic resources, in the end, is about reproducing the forms of scarcity 
that compel freely given forms of submission. In the end, exploitation is “evil,” as Holmstrom puts it, 
“because it involves force and domination in manifold ways and because it deprives workers of control 
that should be theirs” (1997, 88). This overtly humanist formulation, it is worth nothing, is perhaps not so 
distant from post-humanist inflected accounts such as Smith’s (2007) elaboration of an immanent ethics 
which is opposed to, “anything that separates a mode of existence from its power of acting” (68). 
 
It is also worth noting that the empowering promise of the internet is based, in large part, on a direct if not 
deliberate invocation of this notion of exploitation, insofar as it envisions the prospect of overcoming the 
alienation of control over productive activity. This implied critique of alienation lies at the heart of the 
celebration of the de-differentiation of consumer and producer, of audience and performer, reader and 
author, and so on. It is also an important element of those accounts of digital media that discern in them 
the ability to recapture salutary elements of pre-mass society. Such accounts are not to be dismissed out 
of hand, even if they do refer only to that subset of the population with access to the skills, technology, 
and resources for using the internet and related digital technologies. As is frequently pointed out, 
however, these transformations require a reworking and a revisiting of the critique of exploitation: 
industrial-age critiques need to be updated for the digital era. The following section outlines the elements 
of an updated critique that takes into account the productive and, I will argue, alienating role of 
surveillance in the interactive economy.  
 
3. The Role of Surveillance 
 
Two inter-related developments form the basis of an account of exploitation-as-alienation in the digital 
era: the privatization of digital networks (and the applications that run on them), and the way in which 
both of these exploit the built-in capacity for surveillance characteristic of interactive media. Commercial 
entities like YouTube, Blogger, DoubleClick, Gmail (all owned by Google), Facebook, and Amazon.com 
all avail themselves of ‘free labour’ in specific and sometimes different ways (although YouTube also 
includes provisions for letting some contributors claim a share of advertising revenues). All of them also 
rely on the redoubling of user activity in the reflexive form of information about this activity. We might, 
then, divide so-called user-generated content into two categories: the one that gets all the attention, which 
includes the various forms of intentional content created and/or distributed online, and the one which 
unifies these various activities: the fact that all of them are subject to being monitored, recorded, 
aggregated, stored, and sorted. All of them generate data about themselves – content about the content.  
 
Typically, accounts that interrogate the role of exploitation in the participatory online economy focus on 
the first kind of user generated content: fan culture and other forms of intentional interactive participation 
(see, for example, Milner 2008; Postigo 2009; Baym and Burnett 2008; Petersen 2008; Banks and 
Humphreys 2008).  Such accounts tend to find themselves balancing the interest and pleasure users take 
in participation, on the one hand, against the ways in which this participation generates value for 
commercial entities, sometimes at the expense of users. Zwick, Bonsu and Darmody’s critique of 
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consumer ‘co-creation’ outlines the double dimension of online exploitation: “First, consumers are not 
generally paid for the know-how, enthusiasm, and social cooperation…that they contribute to the 
manufacturing process of marketable commodities. Second, customers typically pay what the marketing 
profession calls a ‘price premium’ for the fruits of their own labour” (2008, 180).  
 
A number of questions arise regarding this updated conception of exploitation, including: whether or not 
the ‘free labour’ is ‘surplus’; what, if any, role is played by coercion; and, in related terms, can a notion of 
alienation remain operative? The presumed benefit of interactivity in both cases is to overcome alienation. 
The promise of sites like YouTube and Facebook as well as that of mass customization is that users 
recognize the results of their productive activity as their own. The fact that consumers are willing to pay a 
premium for a customized commodity attests both to the persistence of alienation (we pay more, at least 
in part, to overcome the sense of an anonymous, impersonal, alienated product) and gestures towards its 
overcoming. If surplus labour is that which is expended over and above the amount of activity that users 
might otherwise perform in order to meet their needs and desires, it is not clear that these forms of user-
generated content represent ‘surplus’ labour. Which gets to the question of coercion: in the absence of 
surplus labour, it is trickier to make the case that coercion is operative – although it might be possible to 
argue that background conditions of coercion and expropriation shape the attempt to overcome alienation 
in the process of consumption. That is, that the desire to recognize one’s own participation in the form of 
customized consumer goods provides a measure of compensation for alienation in the workplace. For 
Zwick et al. (2008), even participatory consumers are subject to exploitation in the sense that they do not 
realize the full value that they have added to the commodity via their participation. However, absent 
compelling arguments for coercion and alienation, we end up with a somewhat thinner conception of 
exploitation.  
 
The advent of the social Web and its mingling of social and professional networks casts at least some 
forms of user-generated-content in a different light. Perhaps, in the not too distant future, it may become 
the case that social networking services become crucial productive resources for some types of work. If 
we need access to such services to earn our living, if employers require the creation and exploitation of 
such networks, and if access is privately controlled, then the familiar critique of exploitation becomes 
operative. Networks that once reflected a certain degree of autonomy become subject to workplace forms 
of control.  
 
The case for exploitation is somewhat more straightforward when it comes to another form of user-
generated-content: the data generated by users as they become increasingly reliant upon interactive 
networks for a range of activities encompassing the realms of both production and consumption – as well 
as socializing and communicating with one another. Arvidsson, interestingly, has suggested that this data 
should not be described as something created by users but rather as a kind of found resource captured and 
extracted by those who control the information infrastructure. What such a formulation needs to take on, I 
think, is the way in which the social relations of privatization and commercialization structure the ability 
to ‘stake a claim’ to such a resource. This ability implies a Lockean conception of property rights: 
because commercial entities do the work of creating applications for capturing and mining data, they can 
claim control over it, even though – and here the difference from mineral extraction is perhaps a bit 
clearer – it is information about people who have very little say regarding how it is captured and used to 
manage, sort, or manipulate them. It is the private ownership and control over information infrastructures 
that provides both the incentive and the ability to capture this information. That is to say, it is from the 
fact of private ownership and control of the network and the applications that run on it, that the right to 
control personal information seemingly naturally flows: privatization begets privatization, alienation 
begets alienation.  
 
There is a striking tendency in contemporary academic and popular accounts of the emerging digital 
economy to overlook the political economy of the platform. We often talk about ‘the Web’ and the 
Andrejevic: Surveillance and Alienation in the Online Economy 
Surveillance & Society 8(3) 286 
networks that support it givens – it is a taken-for-granted and largely neutral infrastructure. The 
affordances of the internet and the services that run on it, however, change in accordance with the 
priorities of those who control this infrastructure, and what is taken for granted on one day, such as so-
called “net-neutrality” may well disappear the next. The same goes for platforms and applications which 
are constantly adjusted by their private owners to maximize revenues and increase data collection. The 
flexibility of the virtual environment makes the privatization of cyberspace malleable: as aspects of users’ 
professional and social lives migrate onto networked, commercial platforms, these platforms continue to 
adjust to reflect not just technological developments, but also changing economic models. Control over 
the platform and the applications that run on it, in other words, helps explain how the work of 
‘channelling’ user activity to profitable ends described by Arvidsson (2005) takes place. 
 
4. Surveillance and Alienation 
 
The privatization of the internet’s infrastructure might be described as a form of enclosure of the digital 
commons: the separation of crucial productive resources in the digital era from a new generation of 
productive consumers (for more on the notion of digital enclosure, see Boyle 2003). In this respect, the 
notion of exploitation remains relevant to a critique of the online economy and, in particular, to our 
reliance upon the for-profit utilities that are becoming increasingly indispensable for online work, 
collaboration, and socializing. However, an account of exploitation needs to be updated to take into 
account, on the one hand, the possibility of generating economic value from user participation without 
apparent alienation and, on the other to critique what Arvidsson (2005) describes as a kind of alienation 
without payment: the channelling of productive activity beyond the confines of the workplace and the 
wage labour contract. This article suggests that one way to approach such an account is to consider the 
way in which user activity is redoubled on commercial platforms in the form of productive information 
about user activity – a redoubling that allows alienation and autonomy to overlap.  
 
Monitoring becomes an integral component of the online value chain both for sites that rely upon direct 
payment and for user-generated content sites that rely upon indirect payment (advertising). From a 
commercial perspective, we can view every action that takes place online, whether a purchase or an 
online post, as a reflexively redoubled one. Acts of production and consumption both become, in this 
regard, productive, insofar as they generate information commodities. It is at this level that we can revisit 
a critique of exploitation: insofar as the information can generate surplus value, it is by definition not 
compensated according to its full value. An account of coercion would have to enlist a systemic 
understanding that locates coercion in the social relations that structure access. If we take seriously the 
notion that online forms of interaction and socializing can double as productive immaterial labour, we 
might describe the infrastructures that support them as productive resources, access to which is 
determined by those who own them.  
 
Maybe a more compelling account of exploitation can be made via the notion of alienation. Each form of 
intentional user-generated content – a blog post, a Facebook update, a Tweet, is redoubled in the form of 
‘cybernetic commodities’ (Mosco 1989). These commodities are distinct from the Tweets, posts, 
uploaded videos and so on, and yet they are the result of user activity. They are commodities with market 
value and while they are created by users, they are not controlled by users, who have little choice over 
how and when this data is generated and little say in how it is used. In this sense we might describe the 
generation and use of this data as the alienated or estranged dimension of their activity. To the extent that 
this information can be used to predict and influence user behaviour it is an activity that returns to users in 
an unrecognizable form as a means of fulfilling the imperatives of others. Estrangement, or alienation, 
occurs when our own activity appears as something turned back against us as, ‘an alien power’ (Marx 
1844/2009).  
 
The alienated world envisioned by interactive marketers is one in which all of our actions (and the ways 
Andrejevic: Surveillance and Alienation in the Online Economy 
Surveillance & Society 8(3) 287 
in which they are aggregated and sorted) are systematically turned back upon us by those who capture the 
data. Every message we write, every video we post, every item we buy or view, our time-space paths and 
patterns of social interaction all become data points in algorithms for sorting, predicting, and managing 
our behaviour. Some of these data points are spontaneous – the result of the intentional action of 
consumers; others are induced, the result of ongoing, randomized experiments. Thanks to market 
monitoring, the distinctions between alienated and autonomous activity, at least in the context of 
consumer behaviour, start to blur. Intentional, conscious activity does double duty: it facilitates forms of 
online sociability and creativity on the one hand and, on the other, the data it generates is captured and 
returned to consumers in unrecognizable form. The complexity of the algorithm and the opacity of 
correlation render it all but impossible for those without access to the databases to determine why they 
may have been denied a loan, targeted for a particular political campaign message, or saturated with ads 
at a particular time and place when they have been revealed to be most vulnerable to marketing appeals. 
Much will hinge on whether the power to predict can be translated into the ability to manage behaviour, 
but this is the bet that marketers are making. Or more accurately, this is the bet that a society makes when 
it turns to a monitoring-based system of data-mining and predictive analytics as a means for supporting its 
burgeoning information and communication infrastructure.     
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